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Abstract
Despite containing numerous wealthy geographic areas, the state of Connecticut
continues to struggle with social and economic distress, along with gun-related crime. Problem
analysis in urban areas revealed a critical need for services aimed at deterring violent and gunrelated crime in two target populations: serious juvenile offenders, aged 14-17 years old, and atrisk youth, aged 11-13 years old. Using a quasi-experimental design, this study aimed to evaluate
the effect of Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) on youth in two cities in Connecticut.
Implementation resulted in 133 young people receiving a variety of services in New Haven and
Bridgeport. Evaluation research assessed intervention efforts designed to (1) build on the
strengths and address the challenges of each juvenile offender, (2) expand community outreach
and education efforts to reinforce and reward positive attitudes and behaviors surrounding “nogun policies,” and (3) utilize data-driven decision-making to guide program implementation and
evaluate the results. Our findings suggest that youth who participated in Connecticut’s PSN
youth initiative benefited from the services provided and exhibited a decreased involvement in
the juvenile justice system following enrollment.
Key Words: Project Safe Neighborhoods, crime prevention, juvenile offenders
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Introduction
Although overall violent crime and juvenile violent crime rates steadily declined
following the early-to-mid 1990s, reducing levels of gun and gang violence in inner cities
continues to be a focus of U.S. criminal and juvenile justice systems (Braga and Weisburd, 2012;
Braga et al, 2018; Kennedy, 2009; McGarrell et al, 2013). To quell the previous youth violence
epidemic, by the turn of the century almost every state in the U.S. enacted legislation that
increased the penalties for gang-related offenses, therefore increasing the number of adolescents
who entered the adult criminal justice system (Feld, 2017; Myers, 2005; Zimring, 1998). These
laws relied heavily on deterrence to decrease youth gun violence, and they sometimes were
combined with school and community prevention and intervention programs to discourage youth
involvement in gang-related violence. To illustrate, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) was
initiated in 2001 by the U.S. Department of Justice, in conjunction with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
nationwide, as a federally funded program designed to reduce gun and gang violence through
interagency collaboration in local communities (Grunwald and Papachristos, 2017; McGarrell et
al, 2010; Papachristos et al, 2007). In general, the PSN model was developed by combining
similar policy interventions designed around focused deterrence and problem-solving strategies.
Theoretically, the PSN model emphasizes deterrence and incapacitation through
education and warning about federal and local criminal prosecution for illegal gun possession
and violent, gang, and drug-related offenses involving a firearm (Kennedy, 1997; 2009).
Consistent with the literature on deterrence (Nagin 2013; Paternoster, 2010; Zimring 1976), this
model, through certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, should act to deter and, when
necessary, incapacitate youth from committing violent gun-related crime. As a means of
achieving these goals, PSN involves the collaboration of an interagency task force, including
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local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies, together with community organizers, local
service providers, and school-based programs. Ideally, these agencies will work together to
communicate the model’s conceptual deterrence messages to youth and develop data-driven gun
violence reduction strategies.
A key component stipulated by the PSN model includes the specification of a local
research partner to analyze levels of community gun violence, and together with the task force,
provide a proactive plan for gun crime reduction (McGarrell et al, 2018). The research partners
also are expected to provide ongoing assistance and evaluation of program effectiveness. The
primary goals of the current evaluation were to assess implementation and outcomes achieved
through Project Safe Neighborhoods in Connecticut, and to utilize research findings to enhance
current and future PSN activities and outcomes.
Previous Research
During the past two decades, there has been a surge in the number of published studies
and reports that explore the association between young urban minority males and gun violence
(Dahlberg, 1998; Feld, 2017 Lizotte et al, 1996; Myers 2005). This research was prompted by
the increasing number of youth homicides that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Researchers found that gang membership served as a critical determinant in the likelihood that
young urban minorities will possess firearms and become perpetrators of violence, more so than
other at-risk youth (MacDonald et al, 2005). This pattern of gangs and gun violence was found
in communities characterized by diminished economic opportunities and elevated levels of
poverty, along with limited investment in schools, the health of the neighborhood, and general
services for youth.
Traditionally, the response to gangs and gang-related violence has been concentrated at
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the local level. However, more recently, community-based federal programs aimed at preventing
youth from joining gangs have surged. In assessing localized homicide patterns and prevention
strategies, Wilson, McDonald, and Tita (2010) concluded that programs developed around the
specific strengths and weaknesses of local geographic conditions and with collaborative
community partnerships are more successful at reducing gun violence. Programs such as
Operation Ceasefire (Boston) and other contemporary “focused deterrence” interventions have
used this approach to establish gun violence intervention strategies and evaluate reductions in
gun crime and other outcomes, which helped shape the PSN model.
Operation Ceasefire
Implemented in Boston in the mid-1990s, Operation Ceasefire was designed to pair
criminal justice agencies with local community groups to develop an individual-level
intervention aimed at reducing gang violence and youth gun possession (Braga et al, 2001; Braga
and Pierce, 2005; Kennedy et al, 1996, 2001). The deterrent focus of Operation Ceasefire
centered around the targeting of specific individuals and groups who were identified in the
community as being high-risk for involvement in serious violence. Under this approach,
Boston’s police force would assemble the city’s violent youth gangs and deliver the message that
violent crime would be punished by all legally available means, a process known as “pulling
levers.” The deterrence message was provided to a relatively small audience of gang members,
thereby acting to “increase the certainty and severity of punishment, but only in targeted
circumstances,” and in turn decrease levels of gang violence in Boston (Nagin, 2013, p. 210).
Early research by Braga and colleagues (Braga et al, 2001) revealed a statistically
significant decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides in Boston following
implementation of Operation Ceasefire. The intervention also was associated with a significant
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reduction in gun assaults and police calls for service. Subsequently, Braga and Pierce (2005)
examined the impact of Operation Ceasefire on the illegal trade of new guns in Boston. For 5
years prior to the 1996 implementation of the intervention, the percentage of traced handguns
with a “fast time-to-crime” had been increasing steadily. Statistical analyses revealed a
significant reduction in the use of fast time-to-crime handguns following program
implementation, along with significant reductions in the average monthly percentage of all
recovered handguns that were new, the average monthly percentage of all recovered youth
handguns that were new, the average monthly percentage of illegal possession handguns that
were new, and the average monthly percentage of all recovered crime handguns that were new.
Based on the perceived success of Operation Ceasefire, other locations moved to
implement and evaluate the pulling levers strategy. Similar supportive findings were uncovered
in Indianapolis (Chermak and McGarrell, 2004; McGarrell et al, 2006; Corsaro and McGarrell,
2009), Stockton, California (Braga, 2008), and Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al, 2008), with
the intervention being associated with significant reductions in homicide, gun homicide,
aggravated assaults with a gun, and gang homicide. More recent research by Braga and
colleagues (2013, 2014) reevaluated Operation Ceasefire and found the intervention lead to a
31% drop in the total number of shootings involving Boston gangs, and that total shootings went
down for both targeted gangs and other gangs who took notice, suggesting a “diffusion of
benefits” effect.
Focused Deterrence
As the popularity and research on Operation Ceasefire grew, similar interventions were
implemented across the country. “Pulling levers” initiatives gradually became known as
“focused deterrence,” generally based on problem-oriented policing strategies that follow core

6

principles of deterrence theory and research (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al, 2018;
Kennedy, 2009; Nagin 2013; Paternoster, 2010). Under this approach, known offenders (such as
youth gang members) are targeted and informed that continued criminal behavior will not be
tolerated. They also are told how the criminal justice system and its personnel will respond to
continued criminal behavior through use of all potential sanctions. Moreover, targeted
individuals are provided with the opportunity for compliance rewards and social services, such as
education and job training. In other words, focused deterrence strategies seek to enhance
offender perceptions of the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, while providing
social service opportunities and potential rewards for law-abiding behavior. Interagency
workgroups typically select a particular crime problem (e.g., youth homicide, drug trafficking,
repeat violent offending), develop a plan for sanctioning and providing social services and
community resources, and communicate with known and potential offenders to enhance
understanding of why they are receiving special attention.
Continued research on pulling levers and focused deterrence has revealed positive
findings in such locations as Chicago (Papachristos and Kirk, 2015), Cincinnati (Engel et al,
2013), and New Orleans (Corsaro and Engel, 2015). Systematic reviews and meta-analyses,
primarily by Braga and colleagues (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al, 2018) have
concluded that methodologically rigorous evaluations of focused deterrence interventions
demonstrate an overall statistically significant, moderately sized crime reduction effect,
suggesting these strategies should be part of a broader portfolio of crime interventions available
to policy-makers and practitioners. This recommendation has been followed to a great extent, as
focused deterrence has been incorporated into many federal funded initiatives, such as PSN.
However, despite these positive findings and policy implications, there have been at least a few
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studies that questioned the impact of Operation Ceasefire (Rosenfeld et al, 2005) or failed to
uncover significant effects of focused deterrence on community level violence (Fox and Novak,
2018) and gunshot wounds (Boyle et al, 2010).
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)
Originating in 2001, PSN is a nationwide, federally funded initiative that aims to deter
and incapacitate violent offenders, through interagency collaboration, data-driven problem
analysis and decision-making, and coordinated efforts directed at sanctioning and social services
(Braga et al, 2006; McGarrell et al, 2010; Papachristos et al, 2007). In addition to the theory and
research behind focused deterrence, PSN combines strategies and tactics from other empirically
supported interventions, such as Project Exile (in Richmond, Virginia; Makarios and Pratt, 2012;
Raphael and Ludwig, 2003; Rosenfeld et al, 2005) and the Strategic Approaches to Community
Safety Initiative (SACSI; Coleman et al, 1999). Under SACSI, for example, evaluated sites often
utilized offender notification meetings, media advertisement warnings about gun violence, and
violent crime incident reviews as part of their overall strategic approach. New Haven,
Connecticut, used a process whereby individual gun-related crimes were reviewed by a team of
federal and local prosecutors and law enforcement, with the intention of deterring other violent
offenders through providing more severe sanctions (Roehl et al., 2006). Under this approach,
New Haven experienced a 32% decrease in violent gun crimes and a 45% decrease in calls-forservice for “shots fired,” and other research established that communities introducing SACSI
reported as much as a 50% decrease in gun violence (Hartstone and Richetelli, 2003).
Since 2001, PSN has provided over $2 billion in funding of local programming, coupled
with increased federal prosecution of illegal gun use and possession (McGarrell et al, 2018).
Funding is used to hire new federal and state prosecutors, support investigators, provide training,
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deter juvenile gun crime, develop and promote community outreach efforts, and support other
gun crime and gang violence reduction strategies. Each of the 94 U.S. Attorney districts are
eligible to apply for PSN grants, which have generated a great deal of program implementation
and corresponding evaluation research. In an initial national study, McGarrell and colleagues
(2010) used a quasi-experimental design with longitudinal data from 2000-2006 to compare
trends in violent crime in 82 large cities that implemented PSN with 170 large cities that did not.
The findings indicated PSN target cities experienced significant reductions in violent crime
compared to non-PSN cities, and the results were more pronounced when PSN was implemented
with the most intensity and fidelity to the core PSN principles. Evaluation of PSN in Chicago
(Grunwald and Papachristos, 2017; Papachristos et al, 2007) revealed similar supportive
findings, as did a variety of documented PSN case studies and local level reports (McGarrell et
al, 2018). Much of this latter research has not been published in academic journals, however.
Within this nationwide movement, beginning in 2002, Connecticut’s PSN program
initially was developed and implemented to coordinate innovative and strategic responses to
reduce violent gun crime in targeted communities. This effort focuses on three areas:
1. Building on partnerships between federal, state, and local officials to aggressively
enforce federal and state firearms laws;
2. Fostering prevention and educational programming within school systems and
community-based organizations to emphasize the deadly consequences of gun and gang
violence, the need to refrain from illegal gun use, and the promotion of positive
opportunities for youth and ex-offenders; and
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3. Informing adult and youthful offenders, upon their release from correctional facilities,
about the risks of joining street gangs and the consequences of illegally possessing
firearms. (The United States Attorney’s Office, District of Connecticut, 2017)
In 2012, as part of PSN in Connecticut, Project Longevity was created under the premise that
violence can be reduced dramatically when community members and law enforcement join
together to directly engage with known and potential offenders, while communicating a credible,
moral message against violence; a credible law enforcement message about the consequences of
further violence; and a genuine offer of help for those who want it. A partnership of law
enforcement, social service providers, and community leaders was assembled to implement faceto-face meetings with gang members, coordinate sanctioning and service-delivery, and collect
and analyze data on crime hot spots and the effectiveness of interventions.
In 2014, The Justice Education Center, Inc., received further PSN funding to implement
the Connecticut Project Safe Neighborhoods Youth Opportunity Initiative (PSN Youth) in the
cities of Bridgeport and New Haven. The objectives of the initiative were to:
1. Extend the work of Project Longevity to engage juvenile offenders (age 14-17).
2. Offer individualized and comprehensive intervention plans, designed to build on the
strengths and address the challenges of each juvenile offender.
3. Expand community outreach and education efforts to children ages 11-13, to reinforce
positive attitudes and behaviors and a personal commitment to the “no gangs, no guns”
philosophy.
4. Engage experienced research partners to provide data, guide implementation, and report
results.
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The PSN Youth initiative initially sought to reach known juvenile offenders through “call-in
sessions”, common in pulling levers and focused deterrence approaches. In addition to targeted
deterrence, PSN Youth emphasized providing known offenders (aged 14-17) with prosocial
support for making a choice to cease their criminal lifestyles, through intensive advocacy,
mentoring, individual career plans, and technical education opportunities. PSN Youth also
expanded community outreach and education efforts to reach a younger population of at-risk
youth (aged 11-13).
The purpose of this study was to examine a somewhat unique PSN initiative, focused on
both at-risk youth and known juvenile offenders. Although focused deterrence was a key aspect,
emphasis also was placed on community-based prevention and intervention efforts designed to
provide positive alternatives and prosocial opportunities for behavioral success. Researcher
involvement was intended to help guide program implementation, assess participant progress,
and evaluate outcomes produced by the initiative. The following sections provide a more detailed
description of PSN Youth, the evaluation results, and policy implications.
PSN Youth in Connecticut
Despite having one of the highest median household income levels in the country, some
of Connecticut’s population of nearly 3,600,000 continues to face extreme poverty, particularly
in two of its major cities, Bridgeport and New Haven (American Community Survey, 2017). As
shown in Table 1, social and economic disparity remains high in Bridgeport and New Haven, as
compared to the state and nation as a whole. In these two cities, minority groups members
(based on race and ethnicity) are highly over-represented, although the percentage of the
population under the age of 18 is similar to that of the state and nation. All economic indicators
suggest lower levels of wealth in Bridgeport and New Haven, along with lower levels of health
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insurance and household availability of computers and broadband internet. Educational
attainment also is lower in the two target cities, while unemployment and poverty is higher. In
sum, children and youth living in Bridgeport and New Haven experience a variety of social and
economic risk factors associated with delinquent and violent behavior (Dahlberg, 1998; Feld,
2017: Lizotte et al, 1996; MacDonald et al, 2005; Myers 2005).
Connecticut’s juvenile offender population is divided into youth supervised by juvenile
probation, which is handled by the Judicial Branch’s Court Support Services Division (CSSD),
and youth in placement or on aftercare supervision under the umbrella of the Department of
Children & Families (DCF). In recent decades, Connecticut’s juvenile justice system has
experienced significant reform, resulting in dramatic reductions in juvenile commitments to
secure facilities, increased use of diversionary programs, and declines in recidivism (Ma et al,
2018). Moreover, in recent years, greater attention has been given to the behavioral health needs
of youth, truancy reduction, the school-to-prison pipeline, data collection, youth tracking
systems, and community-based services.
Despite these positive trends, available data suggest some troubling juvenile crime
indicators in Connecticut, particularly for certain cities. To begin, Sickmund and Puzzanchera’s
(2014) comprehensive analysis of juvenile justice data revealed Connecticut to be above national
averages in the proportion of high school students reporting they carried a weapon to school,
used alcohol on school property, used marijuana on school property, and were offered, sold, or
given illegal drugs on school property. In addition, Connecticut’s juvenile violent crime arrest
rates were near the national average, although juvenile property crime arrest rates were
noticeably lower. As shown in Table 2, Connecticut data from 2014 indicate the rate of arrest for
juveniles in New Haven and Bridgeport was approximately 3.0 to 4.6 times higher than the rest
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of the state. Finally, Connecticut Juvenile Court Data from 2014 are summarized in Table 3.
These figures suggest the cities of New Haven, Hartford, and Bridgeport stood out, at the time
PSN Youth was initiated, in terms of petitioned and non-petitioned delinquency cases, as well as
non-petitioned status offenses (Hockenberry et al, 2018). It should be noted that the City of
Hartford originally was to be part of PSN Youth, but due to failing to meet early requirements
for implementation, was not included in the funded program.
Program Design and Implementation
Based on the juvenile data presented above, there was a clear need for an intervention
aimed at deterring New Haven and Bridgeport youth from violent crime and other forms of
delinquency, while providing an opportunity for receiving social services and achieving
prosocial behavioral outcomes. In 2014, Connecticut PSN Youth was organized with a task
force, consisting of agencies from both New Haven and Bridgeport, to support delinquency
prevention and gun violence reduction efforts for at-risk youth and known offenders in the two
cities. Task force members included representatives from the following organizations:
•

Connecticut Board of Education

•

Bullard-Havens Technical High School

•

Connecticut Business and Industry Association

•

Eli Whitney Technical High School

•

Integrated Wellness Group

•

New Haven Office of the Mayor

•

The Charter Oak Group (research partner)

•

The Justice Education Center, Inc. (TJEC)

•

University of New Haven (research partner)
13

•

U.S. Attorney’s Office

•

Workforce Development Board in Bridgeport

•

Youth STAT Youth Services Program
As research partners for the project, personnel from The Charter Oak Group and the

University of New Haven collaborated on data collection and analysis. Representatives of the
research team regularly attended task force meetings (typically held quarterly) and youth call-in
sessions, conducted interviews with service providers, and reviewed available program
documentation and quarterly reports. The Charter Oak Group was responsible for collecting and
maintaining data on all PSN Youth participants. Cleaned and deidentified data later were
provided to University of New Haven researchers for analysis and dissemination of findings.
The initial design of Connecticut’s PSN Youth involved three cites, New Haven,
Bridgeport, and Hartford, with each expected to have approximately 50 youth participants per
year, totaling 300 participants during a 2-year grant period. When Hartford failed to meet
specific requirements for implementation and was dropped from the funded program, resources
were directed to the New Haven and Bridgeport jurisdictions.
Like other PSN initiatives and focused deterrence strategies, Connecticut’s PSN Youth
focused on the idea that increasing the perceived likelihood of arrest and prosecution for gun
offenders will reduce gun crime, through deterrence of potential and known offenders. Initially,
regularly scheduled call-in sessions aimed to alert participating youth that gun-related offenses
will be prosecuted fully. PSN Youth originally sought call-in referrals from probation and police
departments, and occasionally other agencies, like the Department of Children and Families
(DCF). The youth call-in process was designed to both emphasize deterrence and provide
opportunities for services within the community. Initial referrals were anticipated to produce 42
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youth for intensive services. These services entailed program staff conducting a risk assessment,
identifying needed services, and developing an individualized service plan. The primary
recommended service typically was Career Pathways, with 15 slots per year allotted for
vocational training through this program. Other services included summer school, referrals to
Youth Stat (a local delinquency prevention program), case management, resume writing, job
shadowing, and credit recovery.
Early in the program, it became apparent there was some difficulty identifying enough
“justice-involved youth” (i.e., known juvenile offenders) for the program. Therefore, to fill the
allotted spaces, the definition of “justice-involved” was revised to include “at-risk” youth who
were distinguished through school attendance records, suspensions/expulsions, and class reading
proficiency. The primary referral source subsequently changed from probation to schools. This
change and expansion of the target population makes PSN Youth different from the original
Operation Ceasefire model and other similar focused deterrence strategies, but similar to other
evidence-based approaches that emphasize risk assessment, matching youth to services based on
risk and needs, data-driven decision-making, inter-agency collaboration, and program evaluation
(Howell et al, 2014; Lipsey et al, 2010; Myers, 2013; Seigle et al, 2014).
Youth Call-In Sessions
PSN Coordinators from TJEC, with the help of local probation offices, school teams, and
the Youth Stat initiative in New Haven, worked to engage known juvenile offenders and at-risk
youth for PSN Youth programming. A small number of youth who were victims of crime, but
believed to be at-risk for offending, also were included (e.g., known gang members who were
victimized and believed to be at-risk for retaliatory or future crime). Once identified, youth were
invited to voluntary call-in sessions with their parents. Parents were included primarily for
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younger at-risk youth, in an effort to enhance family engagement in social services and
educational programming. Call-ins took place at a local courthouse, a school, or a specific
program location. These meetings typically were held with the following representatives in
attendance: a federal prosecutor, a local prosecutor, the PSN coordinator, and local community
members having alternatives and opportunities to offer to youth. At most call-ins, a local police
officer and a community member who was once a gang member also were present to speak with
the youth. Figure A illustrates call-in session goals.
The sessions began with a brief introduction by the PSN Coordinator, followed by youth
hearing from federal and state prosecutors. Prosecutors discussed what can happen to youth if
they commit (or are with people who commit) crimes involving guns or drugs. Prosecutors often
were followed by a police officer offering positive messages regarding the opportunity to
succeed, and a community member encouraging youth not to make the same mistakes he made.
It should be noted that this part of the call-in session was not a “scared straight” type strategy, as
the community member (usually an ex-gang member) was not being confrontational or
threatening, but rather positive and engaging. Youth also were able to hear from other
community members, social service providers, and therapists who had various services and
opportunities available, ranging from vocational training programs, mentoring, job prospects,
mental health programs, and other prosocial activities.
At the call-in sessions, after all speakers completed their messages, youth were
encouraged to ask questions of prosecutors, community outreach members, service providers,
and anyone else attending the session. A form then was distributed to all youth to complete and
return to the PSN Coordinator, identifying what programming they were interested in attending.
Immediate access to PSN Youth was available at the call-in sessions, but all youth received a
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follow-up contact (either by phone or in person) to further discuss and determine the best
opportunities for them individually. Not all youth who attend a call-in will received personalized
services, but efforts were made to serve all participating youth.
Assessment
Upon identification of a youth as a PSN Youth participant, he or she was referred to the
Integrated Wellness Group for a Post-Secondary Success (PSS) Screener. A member of the
Integrated Wellness Group completed the PSS Screener with the youth and recorded the score
the youth received. In addition, for each participant, the Integrated Wellness Group also
completed a Test for Adult Basic Education (TABE) and provided the results to the PSN
Coordinator, along with the PSS screener score. Additionally, four members of TJEC were
trained in January 2016 on the PSS Screener and on TABE administration. Starting in February
2016, TJEC staff administered all PSS and TABE assessment.
Youth Stat
Youth Stat is a school-based intervention program in New Haven, which seeks to reduce
justice involvement and improve health and wellness outcomes of students from elementary to
post-secondary education (https://www.newhavenct.gov/gov/depts/youth_services/stat.htm). The
goal of this initiative is to enhance school engagement and academic performance among
program-involved youth. Youth Stat identifies youth and connects them to a network of services
that are specifically targeted to their individual needs, which includes but is not limited to:
tutoring, academic support, gang intervention, mental health assessment and treatment, and
employment matching and placement. Youth Stat services were limited to PSN participants in
the New Haven school district and were not offered to youth in the Bridgeport region.
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Career Pathways Technology Collaborative
In collaboration with Youth Stat, New Haven and Eli Whitney Technical High Schools
introduced a program that provided various levels of support to ensure motivated students are
offered technical skills, training, and academic tutoring to achieve success. Services include
education in essential reading, writing, and math skills; training in the fields of
Carpentry/Weatherization, Plumbing, Manufacturing, and Culinary Arts; and certifications for
OSHA-10, CPR/First Aid, ECHO (Empathy, Character, Hope, and Opportunity) Personal
Growth, and Youth Employment Skills.
Media Outreach Campaign
Finally, PSN Youth also partnered with local radio station WZMX Hot 93.7 and
television channel WTIC Fox 61 on a media outreach component, advertising the program to
Connecticut residents in the target areas of Bridgeport and New Haven. Those respective
campaigns produced the results shown in Table 3.
Evaluation Results
Data were collected by the research team through meeting records and observations,
assessment results, records and interviews obtained from service providers, and direct
observation of call-in sessions. Additionally, official delinquency data for New Haven and
Bridgeport youth were obtained from CSSD for analysis. Given limited resources, the primary
focus of this evaluation included the tracking of activities as described above and completing
corresponding statistical analysis. Resource constraints did not allow for a randomized or
matched control group of youth who did not receive PSN services. Funding for this program was
provided through a PSN implementation grant, not a research grant, and there were no plans in
the grant proposal or funding in the grant to conduct a randomized experiment or even a quasi-
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experimental study with a matched comparison group. Data were limited to those youths who
were enrolled in PSN programming in either New Haven or Bridgeport and received services
between 2014 and 2016.
Results
The served target population included 133 youth between the ages of 13 and 19 years old,
with the average age of participants at the start of the program being between 16 and 17 (mean =
16.51). The 133 participating youth were far fewer than the 300 youth originally planned for the
program. This was due mainly to the City of Hartford being dropped from the project, along with
unexpected difficulty in enrolling known offenders in PSN Youth programming. Other
descriptive statistics for program participants appear in Figure B and Table 4. New Haven
enrolled a larger number of youth in year 1, while Bridgeport had a larger number of program
participants in year 2. About 75% of participating youth were male, with a slightly higher
percentage in New Haven. Over 90% of PSN Youth participants were Black, again with a
slightly higher percentage in New Haven. More than half of the total youth were Hispanic, with
over 90% being Hispanic in Bridgeport. Overrepresentation of Black and Hispanic youth
corresponds with the demographic characteristics shown in Table 1. Finally, over 75% of PSN
Youth participated initially participated in a call-in session, and over 80% completed an initial
interview with the PSN coordinator. To clarify, some youth were interviewed without having
attended a call-in session, and some youth attended a call-in session but did not complete a
subsequent interview.
Outcomes of PSN Youth programming are presented in Tables 6 and 7. As shown in
Table 6, 56 youth completed an OSHA-10 (Occupational Safety and Health Administration 10hour training) certificate, 35 completed CPR training, and 11 completed Serv Safe (food and
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beverage safe handling) training. Larger numbers of participants completed a certification in
New Haven than in Bridgeport. In addition, as presented in Table 7, 70 PSN Youth participants
successfully completed Career Pathways, 94 earned credits toward high school graduation, and
28 graduated high school. Thirty-eight youth completed a summer program offered by TJEC in
New Haven, and 90 participants produced a resume. Several of the program outcomes had higher
achievement frequencies in New Haven, while several others were split roughly equally between
the two locations.
In addition to program outcomes, five official outcome measures of delinquency were
obtained from CSSD and coded dichotomously (yes, no): Justice involvement since enrollment
(i.e., having a juvenile court record since enrollment); Arrest at 6 months post enrollment; Arrest
at 12 months post enrollment; Readjudicated at 6 months post enrollment; and Readjudicated at
12 months post enrollment. A measure of youth who were justice involved prior to enrollment
(i.e., having a juvenile court record prior to enrollment) in the PSN Youth initiative also was
obtained. As shown in Table 8, nearly half of program participants exhibited prior justice
involvement, with nearly equal percentages in the two locations.
Of the 133 youth were recruited to take part in the PSN intervention, 64 (48%) had
juvenile justice system involvement prior to enrolling in the program. This included 28 (47.5%)
youth from Bridgeport and 36 (48.6%) from New Haven. Following the PSN intervention, the
total number of youth with justice involvement since enrolling in the program decreased to 45
participants (33.8%). A McNemar's test determined that the difference in the proportion of
justice involved youth pre- and post-intervention was statistically significant (p < .01). Similar
results were produced for both New Haven and Bridgeport youth, although recidivism was
generally lower in Bridgeport, and the difference in pre- and post-intervention justice
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involvement was slightly greater in Bridgeport (p < .05) as compared to New Haven (p < .10).
Although these figures do not control for time at risk in the pre- and post-intervention periods (as
well as other possible confounding factors), they suggest that participating youth benefited from
the PSN intervention. In addition, arrest and adjudication figures in the 6 and 12-month time
periods are relatively low, considering PSN youth typically are higher in risk and needs than the
overall Connecticut youth population.
Table 9 focuses on the PSN Youth participants with prior juvenile justice system
involvement. Of those 64 participants with prior involvement, there were 38 (59%) with justice
involvement following enrollment, of which 14 (50%) were from Bridgeport and 24 (67%) were
from New Haven. Eighteen (28%) were arrested within 6 months of enrollment, and 11 (17%)
were readjudicated within 6 months. Thirty-one (48%) were arrested within 12 months, and 20
(31%) were readjudicated within 12 months. The rates for New Haven participants were higher
than Bridgeport at 6 months; the reverse was true at 12 months.
Six-month rearrest rates for those PSN Youth participants with prior justice involvement
(28%) were encouraging and were lower than six-month rearrest rates for all youth referred to
juvenile court in the state of Connecticut in 2016 (31%; The Charter Oak Group, 2017). The 12month rearrest rate (48%) for PSN Youth participants was slightly higher than the overall 12month rearrest rate for all Connecticut youth referred to juvenile court in 2016 (44%). Given that
PSN youth often experience multiple risk factors and present high needs, this 12-month rearrest
rate comparison is not surprising. Six and twelve month readjudication rates for PSN youth
(17% and 31%, respectively) are perhaps less encouraging, and these figures suggest the need for
more sustained follow-up services with justice involved youth.
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Discussion and Conclusions
In recent decades, as a response to nationwide concern over gun and gang violence in
many urban areas, numerous criminal and juvenile justice initiatives have sought to increase the
perceived certainty of prosecution and incarceration, while providing alternatives and
opportunities for prosocial services and behavioral success. Beginning with Operation Ceasefire,
pulling levers and focused deterrence strategies have used interagency collaboration to provide a
uniform message that violent crime will be punished by all means legally available, and social
services are available to assist those who choose a law-abiding path to behavioral success.
Fueled by supportive research findings in a variety of locations (see, e.g., Corsaro and Engel,
2015; Engel et al, 2013; Papachristos and Kirk, 2015), along with the results of comprehensive
meta-analyses (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al, 2018), PSN is a federally funded
initiative based on targeted deterrence, interagency collaboration, data-driven problem analysis
and decision-making, and coordinated efforts directed at sanctioning and social services (Braga
et al, 2006; McGarrell et al, 2010, 2018; Papachristos et al, 2007).
The Connecticut PSN Youth initiative is unique in that it included both at-risk youth and
known juvenile offenders, including some at younger ages. Following initial call-in sessions,
which included deterrence-based messages from justice system professionals, efforts were placed
on assessing participants and matching them with a variety of social service and educational
programs. Of the 133 PSN Youth participants, 94 (71%) received credits toward graduation, 90
(68%) competed resumes, 70 (53%) completed the Career Pathways program, 56 (42.1%)
received OSHA-10 certification, 35 (26.3%) received CPR certification, and 28 (21%) graduated
from High School (many were not ready or old enough to graduate).

22

In addition to positive program outcomes, recidivism analysis also suggested beneficial
effects from the intervention. There was a statistically significant reduction in juvenile justice
involvement when comparing the pre- and post-enrollment time periods for all PSN Youth
participants, with supportive findings in both Bridgeport and New Haven. Six and twelve-month
arrest and adjudication rates were relatively low, particularly for those youth without prior
juvenile justice system involvement. Recidivism findings were not as encouraging for program
participants who had prior justice involvement, perhaps indicating a need for more intensive and
sustained services for these youth.
Overall, the findings suggest that when deviating from the standard Operation Ceasefire
or focused deterrence approach (in this case by including at-risk youth and focusing more on
educational and vocational opportunities), supportive results can be obtained, but greater
attention should be given to established evidence-based programs and practices (Howell et al,
2014; Lipsey et al, 2010; Myers, 2013; Seigle et al, 2014). Connecticut’s PSN Youth initiative
utilized such evidence-based practices as risk assessment, matching youth to services based on
risk and needs, data-driven decision-making, inter-agency collaboration, and program evaluation.
It appears, however, that medium and higher risk participants (particularly those with prior
juvenile justice system involvement) may not have received empirically supported services of
satisfactory intensity and duration. In addition, although data collection and monitoring were
included in PSN Youth, more rigorous program evaluation was not part of the funding or
implementation plan, which points to the research limitations inherent in this study.
To begin, funding, time, and data limitations did not allow for a randomized experiment
or even a matched comparison group design. The reported evaluation findings are mainly
descriptive, with a before and after statistical comparison of juvenile justice system involvement.
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Although the results are generally positive, methodological limitations limit the strength of the
conclusions and implications that can be formed. However, when combined with previous
findings obtained through more scientifically rigorous studies of focused deterrence and PSN,
the results of this study add to a fairly large body of empirical support.
This study also relied primarily on available program documentation, official measures of
recidivism, and direct observation of call-in sessions. Survey data and qualitative interviews of
program participants and various stakeholders would be two ways to enhance the scope and
depth of the evaluation findings, by generating more extensive information on the perceptions,
experiences, and behaviors of these individuals. In addition to measuring and assessing program
fidelity through these data sources, they may also be better at determining the causal mechanisms
associated with focused deterrence and PSN initiatives. In other words, the current body of
research indicates these approaches “work,” but we do not know as much about why they work.
It could be, for example, that targeted deterrence has direct effects on behavior, indirect effects
through certain social services and prosocial activities, or some combination of both. Survey and
qualitative data would be beneficial in understanding these possible causal mechanisms.
Based on the findings of current and past research, along with the research limitations
noted above, efforts to continue and enhance PSN Youth and similar initiatives should assess
whether planned and implemented services are in line with evidence-based programs and
practices, particularly for medium and higher risk youth (including those with prior juvenile
justice system involvement). Participants should be tracked from call-in sessions through
program completion and beyond, to measure and asses a variety of process and behavioral
outcomes. When possible, more scientifically rigorous program evaluation should occur, but
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additional forms of data collection also can enhance understanding of program implementation
and effectiveness, even when experimental design is not possible.
As supported by prior research, ongoing efforts should be made to engage youth with
prior justice system involvement. While serving at-risk youth is important as well, their risk
levels and needs may be different from those of known offenders, and mixing these youth during
programming actually could increase the likelihood of delinquent behavior by lower-risk youth
(Howell et al, 2014; Lipsey et al, 2010; Myers, 2013; Seigle et al, 2014). Moreover, rearrest and
readjudication figures at 12 months, particularly for youth with prior justice system involvement,
suggest programs should emphasize longer-term programming and follow-up services, again
based on risk and needs. The current analysis of Connecticut’s PSN Youth provides a first step
for evaluating this initiative, but further research should examine ongoing and modified aspects
of PSN programming.
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Table 1: Demographic, Social, and Economic Characteristics of PSN Youth Cities (2017)
Variable

Bridgeport

New Haven

CT

US

147,586

130,884

3,594,478

321,004,407

% Population Nonwhite

59.6%

57.0%

23.3%

27.0%

% Population Hispanic

39.2%

30.4%

15.4%

17.6%

% of population under 18

23.7%

22.1%

21.2%

22.9%

Households

50,341

49,987

1,361,755

118,825,921

Median Household Income

$44,841

$39,191

$73,781

$57,652

Median Family Income

$50,356

$46,671

$93,800

$70,850

Per Capita Income

$22,806

$24,688

$41,365

$31,177

Median Housing Value

$170,300

$189,400

$270,100

$193,500

% Families in Poverty

17.5%

20.4%

7.0%

10.5%

% Under 18 in Poverty

30.5%

33.6%

13.5%

20.3%

% Food Stamps

28.01%

26%

12.4%

12.6%

% No Health Insurance

16.2%

10.3%

6.4%

10.5%

% Computer Households

83.4%

80.2%

88.2%

87.2%

% Broadband Households

74.6%

71.1%

82.1%

78.1%

Population 25 Years Old+

94,935

81,047

2,480,297

216,271,644

% High School Graduates

75.6%

84.6%

90.2%

87.3%

% College Graduates

18.1%

33.9%

38.4%

30.9%

116,323

105,046

2,928,091

255,797,692

13.8%

10.4%

7.2%

6.6%

Population

Population 16 Years Old+
% Unemployed

Note: Data obtained from the American Community Survey, 2017
(https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/)
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Table 2: Juvenile Arrests, ages 13-17, 2014
Variable

Bridgeport New Haven

Juvenile Arrests for Violent Crimes

77

41

Balance of
State
396

State of
CT
599

Juvenile Arrest Rate per 100,000
Violent Crime
Ratio to Balance of State

654

434

143

173

4.6

3.0

1.0

1.2

Note: Data obtained from the Connecticut Department of Public Safety
(https://www.dpsdata.ct.gov/dps/ucr/ucr.aspx)
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Table 3: Connecticut Juvenile Court Cases, 2014
City

Petitioned
Non-Petitioned
Delinquency
Delinquency
Cases
Cases
Bridgeport
772
581
Danbury
152
243
Hartford
1,073
695
Middletown
332
251
New Britain
444
481
New Haven
1.339
503
Rockville
342
264
Stamford
246
227
Torrington
191
203
Waterbury
860
393
Waterford
377
373
Willimantic
264
206
Total
6,392
4,400
Note: Adapted from Hockenberry et al, 2018.
* less than five offenses

Petitioned
Status Offenses

Non-petitioned
Status Offenses

102
8
5
22
*
*
*
5
*
8
8
5
176

540
232
503
243
432
389
158
189
125
257
304
198
3,570
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Table 4: Media Campaign Results
WZMX Hot 93.7
•

•

Reached 13.7% of residents in the

WTIC Fox 61
•

Hartford/New Haven area on average

Hartford/New Haven area on average

2 times each.

2 times each.

Advertisement was heard

•

approximately 260,500 times.
•

Reached 67.8% of residents in the

Ran in key areas, specifically morning

Delivered 221 spots with $5,000 of
added value.

•

and evening commutes.

Ran in all key areas including prime
time, late news, and early morning
news.

•

Advertisement was seen
approximately 1,783,000 times.
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Table 5: Participant Characteristics (n=133)
Total Youth

Bridgeport

New Haven

Male

97 (74%)

39 (67.2%)

58 (79.5%)

Female

34 (26%)

19 (32.8%)

15 (20.5%)

81 (91%)

37 (84.1%)

44 (97.8%)

7 (7.9%)

6 (13.6%)

1 (12.2%)

Hispanic

56 (54.9%)

29 (90.6%)

27 (38.6%)

Non-Hispanic

46 (45.1%)

3 (9.4%)

43 (61.4%)

Participant Site

133 (100%)

59 (44.4%)

74 (55.6%)

Call-In Session Participation

103 (77.4%)

22 (78.6%)

24 (66.7%)

112 (84.2%)

28 (100%)

31 (86.1%)

Gender

Race
Black
White
Ethnicity

Initial Interview
Participation
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Table 6: Certifications Received
Certification Type

Total

Bridgeport

New Haven

OSHA

56

22 (36.1%)

34 (47.2%)

CPR

35

N/A

35 (48.6%)

Serv Safe

11

N/A

11 (15.3%)
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Table 7: Process Outcomes
Outcome

Total

Bridgeport

New Haven

Summer Program Completion

38

N/A

38 (52.8%)

Career Pathways Completion

70

36 (59.0%)

34 (47.2%)

Credits Toward Graduation

94

36 (59.0%)

58 (80.6%)

Graduated High School

28

5 (8.2%)

23 (31.9%)

Resumes Completed

90

47 (77.0%)

43 (58.1%)
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Table 8: PSN Participant Outcomes (n=133)
Total Youth

Bridgeport

New Haven

(n=133)

(n=59)

(n=74)

Justice Involvement Prior to Enrollment

64 (48.1%)a

28 (47.5%)b

36 (48.6%)c

Justice Involvement Since Enrollment

45 (33.8%)a

17 (28.8%)b

28 (37.8%)c

Arrested within 6 months

21 (15.8%)

6 (10.2%)

15 (20.3%)

Adjudicated within 6 months

14 (10.5%)

3 (5.1%)

11 (14.9%)

Arrested within 12 months

35 (26.3%)

15 (25.4%)

20 (27.0%)

Adjudicated within 12 months

23 (17.3%)

9 (15.3%)

14 (18.9%)

Variables

Note: a p < .01, b p < .05, c p < .10
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Table 9: PSN Participant Outcomes for Youth with Prior Justice Involvement (n=64)
Total Youth

Bridgeport

New Haven

(n=64)

(n=28)

(n=36)

Justice Involvement Since Enrollment

38 (59.4%)

14 (50.0%)

24 (66.7%)

Arrested within 6 months

18 (28.1%)

6 (21.4%)

12 (33.3%)

Readjudicated within 6 months

11 (17.2%)

3 (10.7%)

8 (22.2%)

Arrested within 12 months

31 (48.4%)

14 (50.0%)

17 (47.2%)

Readjudicated within 12 months

20 (31.3%)

9 (32.1%)

11 (30.6%)

Variables
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Figure A: Call-In Session Goals

1
2
3

•Locate youth for participation in the voluntary meetings through
cooperation with local law enforcement and gang outreach workers to
identify the individuals in the community who are most likely to be
perpetrators or victims of violence.
•Call-In Sessions will convey a “Smart on Crime” message to encourage
and incentivize youth to make the rights choices and to sensitize them to
the consequences of both negative and positive choices.

•Provide immediate access to opportunities for success for violent-prone
group members.
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Figure B. Participant Summary

PSN Participants Per Site/Per Year
44
38
30
21

New Haven

Bridgeport
PSN Year 1

New Haven

Bridgeport

PSN Year 2

43

